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Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May-June 2008, page 75 Waging Peace The State of the Russian-Iranian Relationship
MARK KATZ, a professor with George Mason University’s Department of Public and International Affairs, spoke on “Russian-Iranian Relations in the Ahmadinejad Era“ at a Feb. 29 program at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC. Noting that a common hostility toward the United States has fostered cooperation between Russia and Iran, the scholar added that, while the U.S. is a common antagonist, there are still significant differences between the two countries. Russia is building Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant and has delivered uranium. President Vladimir Putin visited the Islamic Republic for the first time this year, Katz pointed out, but differences between Russia and Iran cannot be whitewashed. Among the main points of contention Katz described was the fact that, although Russia has “treaded a fine line” with the United Nations Security Council, Iran has been dissatisfied with Moscow’s attempts to protect Tehran’s interests, believing that Russia’s position has softened with each council resolution. For its part, Russia has been trying to safeguard Iran against tougher sanctions championed by the U.S., while simultaneously wanting to cooperate with the U.N. Secondly, Katz continued, Russia agreed in the early 1990s to complete the Iranian nuclear plant begun by West Germany. The project has faced multiple delays, however, and the reactor is still incomplete. These delays have created tensions between Iran and Russia over the latter’s delivery of enriched uranium. In addition, payment disputes have arisen because Iran prefers to use the euro and Russia the U.S. dollar. A third point of contention Katz discussed is over how exactly to enrich uranium. Iran wants to enrich its own uranium using Iranian facilities and scientists, whereas Russia prefers to enrich uranium for Bushehr in Russia with a “joint venture” between the Islamic Republic and Russia. The European Union supports the latter option. Iran rejects any joint ventures that would occur outside the country. A final major point of difference hinges upon claims to the Caspian Sea which Katz described as deadlocked since the early 1990s and the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia supports divvying up the Caspian shoreline based on percentages, which would leave Iran only 13 percent. Iran wants each neighboring state to be given equal shares, which would give it 20 percent. None of these issues are resolved, Katz reiterated, speculating that there could be a nuclear plant in Iran with a Russian joint venture under international observation—but there is no indication that Tehran has (or will) accept this scenario. Another source of divergence, according to Katz, results from the fact that Russia views Iran as needing it to mediate between Tehran and Washington, due to the lack of diplomatic relations. But from an Iranian administrative standpoint, however, if it can defy “the world’s greatest power: America,” then it has no need to make concessions to Russia over nuclear development, enrichment, natural gas, or the Caspian Sea. In this sense, Katz concluded, “Russia can’t afford to offend Iran too much.” —Nina Hamedani |
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