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Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May-June 2008, pages 75-76 Waging Peace A Look At Civilian Deaths In Afghanistan
THE UNITED STATES Institute of Peace in Washington, DC hosted a March 10 conference entitled “Killing Friends, Making Enemies,” at which a panel of experts examined the cost of military-caused civilian deaths in Afghanistan. According to the speakers, U.S., NATO and Afghan forces are engaged in a complex mission to protect Afghans and the central government from resurgent Taliban and al-Qaeda elements, but the inadvertent killings of civilians continues to compromise stability and undermine the mission. “We had 1,500 Afghan civilians who lost their lives in 2007; this is a big number compared to the last five to seven years,” explained Nader Nadery, commissioner for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. “This was the result of air operations and roadside fire, but an equal portion goes to the Taliban targeting of village elders, killing mullahs, and suicide bombings.” Civilian deaths are profoundly harmful to international and national public opinion and, according to the speakers, Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters intentionally place non-combatants in harm’s way. In 2006 they began purposefully using villagers’ homes and rooftops to fire rockets and stage attacks, said Elizabeth Rubin, contributing writer for The New York Times, who has spent time since 2001 reporting in Afghanistan. “Inevitably U.S. or Canadian planes would drop bombs on the house.” In other instances, bad military intelligence was responsible for otherwise preventable casualties. One such high-profile event occurred in July 2002, when celebratory gunfire from a wedding party was mistaken for enemy fire. Nearby NATO forces called in an air strike that killed 47 and wounded more than 100 civilians. As the local hospital filled with casualties, Rubin interviewed a young girl from the party. “I discovered her brother, the bridegroom, was killed, along with her whole family,” Rubin recalled. “She was only 12 years old and she asked me, ‘Why do the Americans always make these mistakes, then come and ask us stupid questions later?’” Rubin described another common scenario where imperfection in intelligence-gathering becomes fatal. “A local informant gives good info one time and he becomes a trusted source,” she explained. “But thereafter he may use the military to settle personal or tribal disputes.” Along with poor intelligence, air attacks also have been a major point of concern in perpetuating unintended civilian casualties. With NATO and U.S. forces stretched thin, the lack of manpower has resulted in an over-reliance on air operations. “We are continuously calling for a decrease in the number of air operations because the large number of civilians killed is in no way proportionate to the Taliban fighters killed,” said Nadery. Starting in 2006 the use of air strikes as support for ground operations increased dramatically, resulting in triple the number of civilian deaths from air operations recorded in 2007 compared to 2006. Poor communication is a common prelude to an air strike, noted Marc Garlasco, senior military analyst for Human Rights Watch. He described a recurring scene in which NATO troops have had long-term control of a region, complete with a working knowledge of the friendly and enemy elements. A secondary force, like the CIA, will enter the area without full knowledge of who is whom and without consulting NATO for information. This new force will accidentally become engaged in an operation and feel “they have no choice but to call in an air strike, which invariably leads to civilian casualties,” Garlasco said. “And then whatever force is regularly stationed there now has to deal with that. Perhaps that area had been turned pro-government and now you’ve got it going the other way.” U.S. and NATO forces have made some attempts to reverse this trend. For example, the new emphasis is on disengaging a small force from a larger enemy force rather than calling in an air strike. Also, compared to recent years, there has been increased attention to the battle for Afghan hearts and minds. For example, the protocol for searching private homes and entering women’s areas has been refined to be more respectful to the local culture, and disruptive practices like sending convoys rumbling through villages at night have been curbed. These efforts are welcomed, but greater systematic changes need to be made. “So far the focus has been only to win this battle militarily, and that’s just not going to work in the long term,” stated Nadery. “There are some issues that, if corrected, would help in reducing peoples’ anger and frustration toward the situation. If people see that their life is going to change—they have roads, they have schools—and [at] the same time see good faces running their offices, as governor, or chief of police, that would enormously affect the way people look to the government and to the international community.” —Josh Walsh |
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